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Abstract
The paper solves constrained Dynkin games with risk-sensitive criteria, where two players
are allowed to stop at two independent Poisson random intervention times, via the theory of
backward stochastic differential equations. This generalizes the previous work of [Liang and
Sun, Dynkin games with Poisson random intervention times, SIAM Journal on Control and
Optimization, 2019] from the risk-neutral criteria and common signal times for both players
to the risk-sensitive criteria and two heterogenous signal times. Furthermore, the paper estab-
lishes a connection of such constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin games with a class of stochastic
differential games via Krylov’s randomized stopping technique.
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1 Introduction
Risk-sensitive criteria constitute a genuinely interesting class of performance criteria in opti-
mization problems, in which the linear expectation E[·] is replaced by the nonlinear expectation
E˜ [·] := g−1(E [g(·)]),
for some strictly increasing function g as a risk-sensitive function. The corresponding risk-sensitive
control has been developed to reflect an optimizer’s attitudes to risks. In particular, the risk-
sensitive function g is chosen to model the optimizer’s attitudes towards risks (e.g. strict concavity
of g reflects risk-aversion of maximization players or risk-seeking of minimization players).
In this paper, we are interested in Dynkin games with risk-sensitive criteria, by taking into
account of both players’ attitudes to risks. Namely, the two players aim to minimize/maximize
some payoff functional R(σ, τ) under the nonlinear expectation E˜[·]:
J(σ, τ) = E˜[R (σ, τ)] = g−1 (E [g (R (σ, τ))]) ,
∗We thank David Hobson for the suggestion of considering heterogenous signal times for constrained Dynkin
games, which motivates the current project.
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where σ and τ are the stopping times to be chosen by the respective minimization/maximization
players. It is called risk-sensitive because
J(σ, τ) ≈ E[R(σ, τ)] −
1
2
lg (E[R(σ, τ)]) Var[R(σ, τ)],
where lg(x) = −
g′′(x)
g′(x) is the Arrow-Pratt function of absolute risk aversion. The case g(x) = x
corresponds to a risk-neutral attitude of both players since lg(x) = 0. For the case of an exponential
utility g(x) = −e−γx with γ > 0, lg(x) = γ is constant and the risk-sensitivity is only expressed
through the risk-sensitivity parameter γ.
The stopping time strategies of the two players are restricted to two independent sequences of
Poisson arrival times as the exogenous constraints on the players’ abilities to stop. The constraints
may represent liquidity effects, indicating the times at which the underlying stochastic processes
are available to stop. Applications of such a liquidity model can be found in [24] for bank runs
and [25] for convertible bonds. The constraints can also be seen as information constraints. The
players are allowed to make their stopping decisions at all times, but they are only able to observe
the underlying stochastic processes at Poisson arrival times. See [11] and [21] for applications to
perpetual American options. Due to the introduction of constraints on stopping times and risk-
sensitive criteria, we call the Dynkin games considered in this paper the constrained risk-sensitive
Dynkin games.
We generalize our previous work [25] on constrained Dynkin games in two aspects: First, it
takes into consideration of both players’ attitudes towards risks via the risk-sensitive function g;
Second, there are control constraints for both players and, moreover, the constraints are different
in the sense that they are allowed to stop at two heterogeneous sequences of Poisson arrival times.
Consequently, since the two players’ stopping time strategies are chosen from two different sequences
of signal times, the usual condition of the upper obstacle U dominating the lower one L is not
required. In [25], the risk-sensitive function g(x) = x and both players stop at a single sequence of
signal times (so U ≥ L is assumed therein).
New challenges arise from the above generalizations. Since the two players stop at two differ-
ent sequences of Poisson arrival times, the first step to solve the constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin
game is merging the two Poisson sequences together while still keeping track of their order. This
is crucial when we consider a family of constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin games (3.5)-(3.6) starting
from different signal times in order to apply the dynamic programming principle. Note that the
starting times of the games (3.5)-(3.6) may not be the respective player’s own Poisson signal times;
instead they could be from the counterparty’s signal times. To deal with the nonlinear expecta-
tion E˜ arising from the risk-sensitive function g, we introduce a new transformation resulting the
auxiliary payoff processes (2.7)-(2.9), which enable us to rewrite the payoff functional under the
linear expectation E instead of the nonlinear expectation E˜. For a special case of exponential risk-
sensitive function g (see section 5.2), the representation formula (2.10) of the game value is closely
related to Cole-Hopf transformation in the literature of backward stochastic differential equations
(BSDEs for short), which is widely used to linearize a class of BSDEs with quadratic growth (see
[18]). Our representation formula (2.10) can be regarded as a stochastic control version of Cole-Hopf
transformation.
We also make a connection of constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin games with a class of stochastic
differential games via Krylov’s randomized stopping technique (see [19]). It is established in [19]
that standard optimal stopping problems (without constraints on stopping times) admit stochastic
control representation, which can be further solved via the so-called normalized Bellman equations.
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The stochastic control representation of the corresponding constrained optimal stopping problems
has been established in [23] (see section 4 therein). In a constrained stopping game setting as con-
sidered in the current paper, it is natural to expect that a stochastic differential game representation
should hold accordingly. Indeed, we show that the two players in the stochastic differential game
choose their respective running controls and discount rates with binary values 0 or the Poisson
intensity λi, and the optimal control is the Poisson intensity λi whenever the value of the game
falls below the lower obstacle process/goes above the upper obstacle process.
Turing to the literature of Dynkin games, there has been a considerable development since the
seminal works of Dynkin [12] and Neveu [32]. The continuous time models were developed, among
others, by Bismut [5], Alario-Nazaret et al [1], Lepeltier and Maingueneau [22] and Morimoto
[30]. In order to relax the dominating condition U ≥ L in those papers, Yasuda [36] proposed
the strategies of randomized stopping times, and proved that the game value exists under merely
an integrability condition. Rosemberg et al [34], Touzi and Vielle [35] and Laraki and Solan [20]
further extended his work in this direction. The non-Markovian case was addressed in Cvitanic and
Karatzas [7] for a fixed horizon and Hamadene et al [14] for an infinite horizon using the theory of
reflected BSDEs. If the two players in the game are with asymmetric payoffs/information, then it
gives arise to a nonzero-sum Dynkin game. See, for example, Hamadene and Zhang [15], De Angelis
et al [10] and, more recently, De Angelis and Ekstrom [9] with more references therein. A robust
version of Dynkin games can be found in Bayraktar and Yao [4] if the players are ambiguous about
their probability model.
On the other hand, the risk-sensitive optimal stopping problems have been studied by Nagai
[31], Ba¨uerle and Rieder [3], Ba¨uerle and Popp [2] and, more recently, Jelito et al [17]. For the
risk-sensitive zero-sum and nonzero-sum stochastic differential games, we refer to El-Karoui and
Hamade`ne [13]. To the best of our knowledge, the study of risk-sensitive Dynkin games is still
lacking, no matter with or without constraints on stopping time strategies. The current paper
offers a first step to understand risk-sensitive Dynkin games, in particular with constraints on the
stopping time strategies.
The constrained optimal stopping problems was first studied by Dupuis and Wang [11], where
they used it to model perpetual American options exercised at exogenous Poisson arrival times.
See also Lempa [21], Menaldi and Robin [27] and Hobson and Zeng [16] for further extensions of
this type of optimal stopping models. From a different perspective, Liang [23] made a connection
between such kind of optimal stopping problems with penalized BSDEs. The corresponding optimal
switching (impulse control) models were studied by Liang and Wei [26], and by Menaldi and Robin
[28] [29] with more general signal times and state spaces. More recently, Liang and Sun [25]
introduced the corresponding constrained Dynkin games (with the risk-sensitive function g(x) = x),
where both players were allowed to stop at a sequence of random times generated by a single
exogenous Poisson process serving as a signal process.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the problem formulation and main result,
with its proof provided in section 3. In section 4, we establish its connection with a class of stochastic
differential games, and in section 5 we further provide two examples. Finally, section 6 concludes
the paper.
2 Constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin games
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a complete probability space endowed with a d-dimensional standard Brownian
motion (Wt)t≥0 with F = {Ft}t≥0 being the minimal augmented filtration of W . The probability
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space also supports two independent sequences of Poisson arrival times T (1) = {T
(1)
n }n≥0 and
T (2) = {T
(2)
n }n≥0 with their respective intensities λ
(1) and λ(2) and the minimal augmented filtration
H = {Ht}t≥0, satisfying T
(1)
0 = T
(2)
0 = 0 and T
(1)
∞ = T
(2)
∞ = ∞. Denote the smallest filtration
generated by F and H as G = {Gt}t≥0, i.e. Gt = Ft ∨Ht, and write λ = (λ
(1), λ(2)).
Let T be a finite F-stopping time representing the (random) terminal time of the game. For
each player i ∈ {1, 2}, let us define a random variable Mi : Ω 7→ N such that TMi is the next arrival
time in the Poisson sequence T (i) following T , i.e. Mi(ω) :=
∑
n≥1 n1{T in−1(ω)≤T (ω)<T in(ω)}.
For any integer n ≥ 0, let us define the control set for each player i ∈ {1, 2} as
R(i)n = {G-stopping time σ for σ(ω) = T
(i)
N (ω) where n ≤ N ≤Mi(ω)}, (2.1)
so the player i chooses from the Poisson arrival times T (i) with intensity λ(i), and T
(i)
n is the smallest
stopping time allowed.
Consider a constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin game, where the two players choose their respective
stopping times σ ∈ R
(1)
1 and τ ∈ R
(2)
1 in order to minimize/maximize the expected cost functional
J(σ, τ) = E˜ [R(σ, τ)] , (2.2)
where the nonlinear expectation E˜ : R→ R is defined via the risk-sensitive function g, i.e.
E˜ [·] := g−1 (E [g (·)]) . (2.3)
The discounted payoff functional R(σ, τ) in (2.2) is defined by
R(σ, τ) =
∫ σ∧τ∧T
0
e−rsfs ds+ e
−rT ξ1{σ∧τ≥T} + e
−rτLτ1{τ<T,τ≤σ} + e
−rσUσ1{σ<T,σ<τ}, (2.4)
where r > 0 is the discount rate, and f , as a real-valued F-progressively measurable process, is
the running payoff. The terminal payoff is U if σ happens firstly, L if τ happens firstly or σ and
τ happen simultaneously, and ξ otherwise, where L and U are two real-valued F-progressively
measurable processes, and ξ is a real-valued FT -measurable random variable.
Let us define the upper and lower values of the constrained risk-sensitve Dynkin game
vλ = inf
σ∈R
(1)
1
sup
τ∈R
(2)
1
J(σ, τ), and vλ = sup
τ∈R
(2)
1
inf
σ∈R
(1)
1
J(σ, τ). (2.5)
The game (2.5) is said to have value vλ if vλ = vλ = vλ, and a saddle point (σ∗, τ∗) ∈ R
(1)
1 ×R
(2)
1
is called an optimal stopping strategy of the game if
J(σ∗, τ) ≤ J(σ∗, τ∗) ≤ J(σ, τ∗),
for every (σ, τ) ∈ R
(1)
1 ×R
(2)
1 .
Compared with the constrained Dynkin game introduced in [25], there are two new features of
the game (2.5): First, it takes into consideration of the both players’ attitudes towards risks via the
risk-sensitive function g; Second, there are control constraints for both players and, moreover, the
constraints are different in the sense that they are allowed to stop at two heterogeneous sequences of
Poisson arrival times. As a consequence, since the two players’ stopping time strategies are chosen
from two different control sets, the usual dominating condition U ≥ L is not required. In [25], the
risk-sensitive function g(x) = x and both players stop at a single sequence of Poisson arrival times
(so U ≥ L is a critical assumption therein).
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2.1 Main result
To solve the above constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin game, we introduce the characterizing
BSDE on a random horizon [0, T ]:
Q
λ
t∧T = ξ +
∫ T
t∧T
[
−λ(1)
(
Q
λ
s − Us
)+
+ λ(2)
(
Ls −Q
λ
s
)+
− rQ
λ
s
]
ds−
∫ T
t∧T
Z
λ
s dWs, (2.6)
for t ≥ 0, where the auxiliary payoff processes L, U and ξ are given by
Lt = e
rtg(e−rtLt +
∫ t
0
e−rufu du), (2.7)
U t = e
rtg(e−rtUt +
∫ t
0
e−rufu du), (2.8)
ξ = erT g(e−rT ξ +
∫ T
0
e−rufu du), (2.9)
respectively. And also we set Q
λ
t ≡ ξ for t ≥ T . Moreover, we introduce the following spaces: for
any given α ∈ R and n ∈ N,
• L2,nα : FT -measurable random variables ξ : Ω 7→ R
n with E
[
e2αT ||ξ||2
]
<∞,
• H2,nα : F-progressively measurable processes ϕ : [0, T ]×Ω 7→ R
n with E
[∫ T
0 e
2αs||ϕs||
2 ds
]
<
∞,
• S2,nα : F-progressivelymeasurable processes ϕ : [0, T ]×Ω 7→ R
n withE
[
sups∈[0,T ] e
2αs||ϕs||
2
]
<
∞,
where we denote L2,n0 , H
2,n
0 and S
2,n
0 by L
2,n, H2,n and S2,n for the ease of notation.
We impose the following assumptions on the risk-sensitive function g, the running payoff f and
the terminal payoffs L, U and ξ in terms of the auxiliary payoffs L, U and ξ.
Assumption 2.1 The deterministic risk-sensitive function g : R → R is strictly increasing and,
moreover, (i) when T is an unbounded stopping time, L, U and ξ are all bounded; (ii) when T is
a bounded stopping time, L ∈ S2,1, U ∈ S2,1 and ξ ∈ L2,1, where L, U and ξ are given by (2.7),
(2.8) and (2.9), respectively.
On one hand, since the two players’ control sets are different, the usual dominating condition
U ≥ L is not required. On the other hand, the conditions (i) and (ii) in Assumption 2.1 guarantee
the existence and uniqueness of the solution to BSDE (2.6), which will in turn be used to construct
the game value and its associated optimal stopping strategy. Under Assumption 2.1, the solvability
of BSDE (2.6) follows from Theorem 3.3 in [6] (when T is unbounded) and Theorem 4.1 in [33]
(when T is bounded), and thus we omit the proof of the following proposition and refer to [6] and
[33] for the details.
Proposition 2.2 Suppose that Assumption 2.1 holds. Then, there exists a unique solution (Q
λ
, Z
λ
)
to BSDE (2.6). Moreover, (i) when T is an unbounded stopping time, Q
λ
is continuous and bounded,
and Z
λ
belongs to H2,d−r ; (ii) when T is a bounded stopping time, the solution pair (Q
λ
, Z
λ
) belong
to S2,1 ×H2,d.
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We are now in a position to state the main result of this paper.
Theorem 2.3 Suppose that Assumption 2.1 holds. Let (Q
λ
, Z
λ
) be the unique solution to BSDE
(2.6), and define the value process
Qλt = e
r(t∧T )g−1(e−r(t∧T )Q
λ
t )−
∫ t∧T
0
e−r(u−t∧T )fu du, (2.10)
for t ≥ 0. Then, the value of the constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin game (2.5) exists and is given
by
vλ = vλ = vλ = Qλ0 .
Moreover, the optimal stopping strategy of the game is given by

σ∗ = inf{T
(1)
N ≥ T
(1)
1 : Q
λ
T
(1)
N
≥ U
T
(1)
N
} ∧ T
(1)
M1
;
τ∗ = inf{T
(2)
N ≥ T
(2)
1 : Q
λ
T
(2)
N
≤ L
T
(2)
N
} ∧ T
(2)
M2
.
Remark 2.4 For a special case of exponential risk-sensitive function g (see section 5.2), the rep-
resentation formula (2.10) is closely related to Cole-Hopf transformation in the BSDE literature,
which is widely used to linearize a class of BSDEs with quadratic growth (see [18]). Our represen-
tation formula (2.10) can be regarded as a stochastic control version of Cole-Hopf transformation.
3 Proof of Theorem 2.3
Since the two players stop at two different sequences of Poisson arrival times, the first step to
prove Theorem 2.3 is merging the two Poisson sequences together while still keeping track of their
order. To this end, for each T (1) and T (2), we construct an increasing sequence of G-stopping times
θ = (θk)k≥0 as follows:
θ0 = T
(1)
0 = T
(2)
0 = 0,
θ1 = min
(
T
(1)
1 , T
(2)
1
)
,
θ2 = min
(
T
(1)
1 1{T
(1)
1 >θ1}
+ T
(1)
2 1{T
(1)
1 ≤θ1}
, T
(2)
1 1{T
(2)
1 >θ1}
+ T
(2)
2 1{T
(2)
1 ≤θ1}
)
,
θ3 = min
(
T
(1)
1 1{T
(1)
1 >θ2}
+ T
(1)
3 1{T
(1)
1 ≤θ2}
, T
(1)
2 1{T
(1)
2 >θ2}
+ T
(1)
3 1{T
(1)
2 ≤θ2}
,
T
(2)
1 1{T
(2)
1 >θ2}
+ T
(2)
3 1{T
(2)
1 ≤θ2}
, T
(2)
2 1{T
(2)
2 >θ2}
+ T
(2)
3 1{T
(2)
2 ≤θ2}
)
,
· · · ,
θk = min
(
T
(1)
1 1{T
(1)
1 >θk−1}
+ T
(1)
k 1{T
(1)
1 ≤θk−1}
, · · · , T
(1)
k−11{T
(1)
k−1>θk−1}
+ T
(1)
k 1{T
(1)
k−1≤θk−1}
,
T
(2)
1 1{T
(2)
1 >θk−1}
+ T
(2)
k 1{T
(2)
1 ≤θk−1}
, · · · , T
(2)
k−11{T
(2)
k−1
>θk−1}
+ T
(2)
k 1{T
(2)
k−1
≤θk−1}
)
,
· · · .
In Figure 1, we illustrate the construction of the merged sequence θ, where the top and the middle
line are a realization of T (1) and T (2), and the bottom line is the merged sequence θ. Intuitively,
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given any G-stopping time θk−1, k ≥ 1, (to be used as the starting times for a family of constrained
Dynkin games (3.5)-(3.6) below), we find the first arrival time of each Poisson sequence following
θk−1, say T
(1)
k1
and T
(2)
k2
for some k1, k2 ≥ 0, and then define θk = min{T
(1)
k1
, T
(2)
k2
}. Moreover, given
the stopping time θk, we define pre-θk σ-field:
Gθk =

A ∈ ∨
s≥0
Gs : A ∩ {θk ≤ s} ∈ Gs for s ≥ 0

 ,
and G˜ = {Gθk}k≥0.
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
T(2)
T(1)
T(1)0 T
(1)
1 T
(1)
2 T
(1)
3
T(2)0 T
(2)
1 T
(2)
2 T
(2)
3 T
(2)
4
Figure 1: An illustration of a merged Poisson arrival sequence θ.
Next, we tackle the nonlinear expectation E˜ associated with the risk-sensitive function g. To
this end, introduce the discounted processes
L˜t = e
−rtLt +
∫ t
0
e−rufu du, (3.1)
U˜t = e
−rtUt +
∫ t
0
e−rufu du, (3.2)
ξ˜ = e−rT ξ +
∫ T
0
e−rufu du, (3.3)
and rewrite the discounted payoff functional R(σ, τ) as
R˜(σ, τ) = ξ˜1{σ∧τ≥T} + L˜τ1{τ<T,τ≤σ} + U˜σ1{σ<T,σ<τ} = R(σ, τ). (3.4)
In turn, consider a family of constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin games starting from θk−1, for k ≥ 1,
whose upper and lower values are defined by
qλθk−1 = ess inf
σ∈R˜
(1)
θ
k
ess sup
τ∈R˜
(2)
θ
k
E˜
[
R˜ (σ, τ) |Gθk−1
]
, (3.5)
qλ
θk−1
= ess sup
τ∈R˜
(2)
θ
k
ess inf
σ∈R˜
(1)
θ
k
E˜
[
R˜ (σ, τ) |Gθk−1
]
, (3.6)
where
R˜
(i)
θk
= {G-stopping time σ for σ(ω) = T
(i)
N (ω) where T
(i)
N (ω) ≥ θk and N ≤Mi(ω)}. (3.7)
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Remark 3.1 Note that in the above definition of control set R˜
(i)
θk
, θk is not necessary from the
Poisson sequence T (i), so R˜
(i)
θk
is in general different from R
(i)
k in (2.1). However, they do coincide
when k = 1: R˜
(i)
θ1
= R
(i)
1 .
On the other hand, thanks to the introduction of the discounted processes L˜, U˜ and ξ˜ in (3.1)-
(3.3), the payoff functional in (3.4) can be divided into three disjoint sets and the risk-sensitive
function g can be applied to each of them separately. Thus, we can rewrite the payoff in (3.5)-(3.6)
under the linear expectation E of the auxiliary payoff processes L, U and ξ as
E˜
[
R˜ (σ, τ) |Gθk−1
]
= g−1
(
E
[
e−rT ξ1{σ∧τ≥T} + e
−rτLτ1{τ<T,τ≤σ} + e
−rσUσ1{σ<T,σ<τ}|Gθk−1
])
.
This motives us to introduce the Cole-Hopf representation formula (2.10).
The constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin game (3.5)-(3.6) is said to have value qλθk−1 if q
λ
θk−1
=
qλθk−1 = q
λ
θk−1
, and (σ∗k, τ
∗
k ) ∈ R˜
(1)
θk
× R˜
(2)
θk
is called an optimal stopping strategy of the game if
E˜
[
R˜(σ∗k, τ)|Gθk−1
]
≤ E˜
[
R˜(σ∗k, τ
∗
k )|Gθk−1
]
≤ E˜
[
R˜(σ, τ∗k )|Gθk−1
]
,
for every (σ, τ) ∈ R˜
(1)
θk
× R˜
(2)
θk
. In particular, when k = 1, (3.5)-(3.6) corresponds to the original
constrained Dynkin game (2.5). Thus, to prove Theorem 2.3, it is sufficient to show that
qλθk−1 = q
λ
θk−1
= qλ
θk−1
= Q˜λθk−1,
and the optimal stopping strategy is given by

σ∗k = inf{T
(1)
N ≥ θk : Q˜
λ
T
(1)
N
≥ U˜
T
(1)
N
} ∧ T
(1)
M1
,
τ∗k = inf{T
(2)
N ≥ θk : Q˜
λ
T
(2)
N
≤ L˜
T
(2)
N
} ∧ T
(2)
M2
,
(3.8)
where Q˜λ is given by
Q˜λt = g
−1(e−r(t∧T )Q
λ
t ), (3.9)
with Q
λ
being the first component of the solution to BSDE (2.6). In turn, the value process Qλ in
(2.3) is given via the discounted process Q˜λ via the relationship
Qλt = e
r(t∧T )Q˜λt −
∫ t∧T
0
e−r(u−t∧T )fudu. (3.10)
Note that, for t ≥ T ,
Qλt = e
rTg−1(e−rT ξ)−
∫ T
0
e−r(u−T )fudu = ξ.
Remark 3.2 For the reader’s convenience, we recall the notations that have been introduced thus
far. For the payoff processes h = L,U, ξ, we have defined the discounted processes h˜t = e
−rtht +∫ t
0
e−rufu du, and auxiliary payoff processes ht = e
rtg(h˜t). In terms of the value process Q
λ, likewise
we have Q˜λt = e
−rtQλt +
∫ t
0
e−rufu du, and Q
λ
t = e
rtg(Q˜λt ), for t ∈ [0, T ].
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To prove the above assertions (and therefore Theorem 2.3), we start with the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3 Suppose that Assumption 2.1 holds. Then, Q˜λθk−1 given in (3.9) satisfies the recursive
equation
Q˜λθk−1 = E˜
[
ξ˜1{θk≥T} +
(
min{U˜θk , Q˜
λ
θk
}1{θk∈T (1)} +max{L˜θk , Q˜
λ
θk
}1{θk∈T (2)}
)
1{θk<T}
∣∣∣Gθk−1] ,
(3.11)
for k ≥ 1.
Proof. It is equivalent to prove that
g(Q˜λθk−1) = E
[
g(ξ˜)1{θk≥T}
+
(
min{g(U˜θk), g(Q˜
λ
θk
)}1{θk∈T (1)} +max{g(L˜θk), g(Q˜
λ
θk
)}1{θk∈T (2)}
)
1{θk<T}
∣∣∣Gθk−1] , (3.12)
where g(ξ˜) = e−rT ξ, g(L˜t) = e
−rtLt and g(U˜t) = e
−rtU t. For k such that θk−1 > T , it follows from
(3.9) that g(Q˜λθk−1) = g(ξ˜), and thus (3.12) holds. In the rest of the proof, we only focus on the
cases where θk−1 ≤ T .
By applying Itoˆ’s formula to αtg(Q˜
λ
t ), where αt = e
−(λ(1)+λ(2))t, we can obtain that
αt∧T g(Q˜
λ
t∧T ) = αT g(ξ˜) +
∫ T
t∧T
αs
[
(λ(1) + λ(2))g(Q˜λs )− λ
(1)
(
g(Q˜λs )− g(U˜s)
)+
+ λ(2)
(
g(L˜s)− g(Q˜
λ
s )
)+ ]
ds−
∫ T
t∧T
αse
−rsZ
λ
s dWs
= αT g(ξ˜) +
∫ T
t∧T
αs
[
λ(1)min
{
g(U˜s), g(Q˜
λ
s )
}
+ λ(2)max
{
g(L˜s), g(Q˜
λ
s )
}]
ds
−
∫ T
t∧T
αse
−rsZ
λ
s dWs,
for t ≥ 0. By choosing t = θk−1 and taking the conditional expectation with respect to Gθk−1 , we
further have
g(Q˜λθk−1) = E
[
e−(λ
(1)+λ(2))(T−θk−1)g(ξ˜)
+
∫ T
θk−1
e−(λ
(1)+λ(2))(s−θk−1)
[
λ(1)min
{
g(U˜s), g(Q˜
λ
s )
}
+ λ(2)max
{
g(L˜s), g(Q˜
λ
s )
}]
ds
∣∣∣∣Gθk−1
]
,
(3.13)
for any k ≥ 1.
On the other hand, by defining T˜
(i)
t as the first arrival time in T
(i) following any fixed time t,
i.e. T˜
(i)
t = inf{T
(i)
N ≥ T
(i)
1 : T
(i)
N > t}, we can rewrite the right-hand-side of (3.12) as
E
[
g(ξ˜)1
{T˜
(1)
θ
k−1
∧T˜
(2)
θ
k−1
≥T}
+min
{
g(U˜
T˜
(1)
θ
k−1
), g(Q˜λ
T˜
(1)
θ
k−1
)
}
1
{T˜
(1)
θ
k−1
<T,T˜
(1)
θ
k−1
<T˜
(2)
θ
k−1
}
+ max
{
g(L˜
T˜
(2)
θ
k−1
), g(Q˜λ
T˜
(2)
θ
k−1
)
}
1
{T˜
(2)
θ
k−1
<T,T˜
(2)
θ
k−1
≤T˜
(1)
θ
k−1
}
∣∣∣∣Gθk−1
]
. (3.14)
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Indeed, applying the joint probability density function of (T˜
(1)
θk−1
, T˜
(2)
θk−1
) conditional on Gθk−1 ,
pθk−1(S,U) = λ
(1)e−λ
(1)(S−θk−1)λ(2)e−λ
(2)(U−θk−1),
yields that
E
[
g(ξ˜)1
{T˜
(1)
θ
k−1
∧T˜
(2)
θ
k−1
≥T}
∣∣∣∣Gθk−1
]
= E
[
g(ξ˜)
∫∫
S∧U≥T
pθk−1(S,U) dS dU
∣∣∣∣Gθk−1
]
= E
[
g(ξ˜)
∫∫
U≥S≥T
λ(1)e−λ
(1)(S−θk−1)λ(2)e−λ
(2)(U−θk−1) dS dU︸ ︷︷ ︸
(I)
∣∣∣∣Gθk−1
]
+E
[
g(ξ˜)
∫∫
S≥U≥T
λ(1)e−λ
(1)(S−θk−1)λ(2)e−λ
(2)(U−θk−1) dS dU︸ ︷︷ ︸
(II)
∣∣∣∣Gθk−1
]
,
where the first integral
(I) = λ(1)
∫ ∞
T
e−λ
(1)(S−θk−1)(
∫ ∞
S
λ(2)e−λ
(2)(U−θk−1) dU) dS =
λ(1)
λ(1) + λ(2)
e−(λ
(1)+λ(2))(T−θk−1),
and, similarly, the second integral
(II) =
λ(2)
λ(1) + λ(2)
e−(λ
(1)+λ(2))(T−θk−1).
In turn, we obtain
E
[
g(ξ˜)1
{T˜
(1)
θ
k−1
∧T˜
(2)
θ
k−1
≥T}
∣∣∣∣Gθk−1
]
= E
[
e−(λ
(1)+λ(2))(T−θk−1)g(ξ˜)
∣∣∣Gθk−1] . (3.15)
Similarly, we have
E
[
min
{
g(U˜
T˜
(1)
θ
k−1
), g(Q˜λ
T˜
(1)
θ
k−1
)
}
1
{T˜
(1)
θ
k−1
<T,T˜
(1)
θ
k−1
<T˜
(2)
θ
k−1
}
∣∣∣∣Gθk−1
]
= E
[∫∫
θk−1<S<T,S<U
min
{
g(U˜S), g(Q˜
λ
S)
}
pθk−1(S,U) dS dU
∣∣∣∣∣Gθk−1
]
= E
[∫ T
θk−1
λ(1)e−λ
(1)(S−θk−1)min
{
g(U˜S), g(Q˜
λ
S)
}
(
∫ ∞
S
λ(2)e−λ
(2)(U−θk−1) dU) dS
∣∣∣∣∣Gθk−1
]
= E
[∫ T
θk−1
λ(1)e−(λ
(1)+λ(2))(S−θk−1)min
{
g(U˜S), g(Q˜
λ
S)
}
dS
∣∣∣∣∣Gθk−1
]
, (3.16)
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and
E
[
max
{
g(L˜
T˜
(2)
θ
k−1
), g(Q˜λ
T˜
(2)
θ
k−1
)
}
1
{T˜
(2)
θ
k−1
<T,T˜
(2)
θ
k−1
≤T˜
(1)
θ
k−1
}
∣∣∣∣Gθk−1
]
= E
[∫ T
θk−1
λ(2)e−(λ
(1)+λ(2))(U−θk−1)max
{
g(L˜U ), g(Q˜
λ
U )
}
dU
∣∣∣∣∣Gθk−1
]
. (3.17)
It follows from (3.13), (3.15), (3.16) and (3.17) that (3.12) holds for any k ≥ 1. Hence, Qλθk−1 ,
which is given by (3.9), satisfies the recursive equation (3.11), for k ≥ 1.
As a direct consequence of Lemma 3.3, we deduce that Qˆλθk−1 defined by
Qˆλθk−1 := ξ˜1{θk−1≥T}+
(
min{U˜θk−1 , Q˜
λ
θk−1
}1{θk−1∈T (1)}+max{L˜θk−1, Q˜
λ
θk−1
}1{θk−1∈T (2)}
)
1{θk−1<T},
(3.18)
where Q˜λθk−1 is given by (3.9), satisfies the recursive equation
Qˆλθk−1 = ξ˜1{θk−1≥T} +
(
min{U˜θk−1, E˜[Qˆ
λ
θk
|Gθk−1 ]}1{θk−1∈T (1)}
+max{L˜θk−1 , E˜[Qˆ
λ
θk
|Gθk−1 ]}1{θk−1∈T (2)}
)
1{θk−1<T}, (3.19)
for k ≥ 1.
We will show that Qˆλθk−1 in (3.18) is actually the unique solution of the recursive equation
(3.19). The uniqueness is proved by showing that Qˆλθk−1 is the value of an auxiliary constrained
risk-sensitive Dynkin game starting from θk−1, whose upper and lower values are defined by
qˆ
λ
θk−1
= ess inf
σ∈R˜
(1)
θ
k−1
ess sup
τ∈R˜
(2)
θ
k−1
E˜
[
R˜(σ, τ)|Gθk−1
]
, (3.20)
qˆλ
θk−1
= ess sup
τ∈R˜
(2)
θ
k−1
ess inf
σ∈R˜
(1)
θ
k−1
E˜
[
R˜(σ, τ)|Gθk−1
]
, (3.21)
where the payoff functional R˜(σ, τ) is given by (3.4) and the control set R˜
(i)
θk−1
is given by (3.7).
The auxiliary game (3.20)-(3.21) is said to have value qˆλθk−1 if qˆ
λ
θk−1
= qˆ
λ
θk−1
= qˆλ
θk−1
, and
(σˆ∗k−1, τˆ
∗
k−1) ∈ R˜
(1)
θk−1
× R˜
(2)
θk−1
is called an optimal stopping strategy of the game (3.20)-(3.21) if
E˜
[
R˜(σ∗k−1, τ)|Gθk−1
]
≤ E˜
[
R˜(σ∗k−1, τ
∗
k−1)|Gθk−1
]
≤ E˜
[
R˜(σ, τ∗k−1)|Gθk−1
]
,
for every (σ, τ) ∈ R˜
(1)
θk−1
× R˜
(2)
θk−1
.
The difference between (3.20)-(3.21) and (3.5)-(3.6) is that the players first make their stopping
decisions and then move forward in the former game, while in the latter game they first move
forward and then make their decisions.
Lemma 3.4 Suppose that Assumption 2.1 holds. Then, for any k ≥ 1, the value of the auxiliary
constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin game (3.20)-(3.21) starting from θk−1 exists. Its value qˆ
λ
θk−1
is
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the unique solution of the recursive equation (3.19). Hence, qˆλθk−1 = Qˆ
λ
θk−1
, where the latter is given
by (3.18). The optimal stopping strategy of the auxiliary constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin game
(3.20)-(3.21) is given by

σˆ∗k−1 = inf{T
(1)
N ≥ θk−1 : Qˆ
λ
T
(1)
N
= U˜
T
(1)
N
} ∧ T
(1)
M1
;
τˆ∗k−1 = inf{T
(2)
N ≥ θk−1 : Qˆ
λ
T
(2)
N
= L˜
T
(2)
N
} ∧ T
(2)
M2
.
(3.22)
Proof. Step 1. Let Qˆλθk−1 be a solution of the recursive equation (3.19) for k ≥ 1. We claim
the following martingale properties hold:
(i)
(
Qˆλθm∧σˆ∗k−1∧τˆ∗k−1
)
m≥k−1
is a G˜-martingale under the nonlinear expectation E˜;
(ii)
(
Qˆλθm∧σˆ∗k−1∧τ
)
m≥k−1
is a G˜-supermartingale under E˜, for any τ ∈ R˜
(2)
θk−1
;
(iii)
(
Qˆλθm∧σ∧τˆ∗k−1
)
m≥k−1
is a G˜-submartingale under E˜, for any σ ∈ R˜
(1)
θk−1
.
If the martingale property (i) holds, then, for k ≥ 1,
Qˆλθk−1 = Qˆ
λ
θk−1∧σˆ∗k−1∧τˆ
∗
k−1
= E˜
[
Qˆλσˆ∗
k−1∧τˆ
∗
k−1
|Gθk−1
]
,
and the definition of (σˆ∗k−1, τˆ
∗
k−1) in (3.22) further yields that
Qˆλθk−1 = E˜
[
ξ˜1{σˆ∗
k−1∧τˆ
∗
k−1≥T}
+ Qˆλτˆ∗
k−1
1{τˆ∗
k−1<T,τˆ
∗
k−1≤σˆ
∗
k−1}
+ Qˆλσˆ∗
k−1
1{σˆ∗
k−1<T,σˆ
∗
k−1<τˆ
∗
k−1}
|Gθk−1
]
= E˜
[
ξ˜1{σˆ∗
k−1∧τˆ
∗
k−1≥T}
+ L˜τˆ∗
k−1
1{τˆ∗
k−1<T,τˆ
∗
k−1≤σˆ
∗
k−1}
+ U˜σˆ∗
k−1
1{σˆ∗
k−1<T,σˆ
∗
k−1<τˆ
∗
k−1}
|Gθk−1
]
= E˜
[
R˜(σˆ∗k−1, τˆ
∗
k−1)|Gθk−1
]
. (3.23)
Using the similar arguments, if the supermartingale property (ii) and the submartingale property
(iii) hold, then we have, for any τ ∈ R˜
(2)
θk−1
,
Qˆλθk−1 ≥ E˜
[
Qˆλσˆ∗
k−1∧τ
|Gθk−1
]
= E˜
[
ξ˜1{σˆ∗
k−1∧τ≥T}
+ Qˆλτ 1{τ<T,τ≤σˆ∗k−1} + Qˆ
λ
σˆ∗
k−1
1{σˆ∗
k−1<T,σˆ
∗
k−1<τ}
|Gθk−1
]
≥ E˜
[
ξ˜1{σˆ∗
k−1∧τ≥T}
+ L˜τ1{τ<T,τ≤σˆ∗
k−1}
+ U˜σˆ∗
k−1
1{σˆ∗
k−1<T,σˆ
∗
k−1<τ}
|Gθk−1
]
= E˜
[
R˜(σˆ∗k−1, τ)|Gθk−1
]
, (3.24)
and, for any σ ∈ R˜
(1)
θk−1
,
Qˆλθk−1 ≤ E˜
[
R˜(σ, τˆ∗k−1)|Gθk−1
]
. (3.25)
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It follows from (3.24) and (3.25) that
Qˆλθk−1 ≥ ess sup
τ∈R˜
(2)
θ
k−1
E˜
[
R˜(σˆ∗k−1, τ)|Gθk−1
]
≥ ess inf
σ∈R˜
(1)
θ
k−1
ess sup
τ∈R˜
(2)
θ
k−1
E˜
[
R˜(σ, τ)|Gθk−1
]
= qˆ
λ
θk−1
,
and
Qˆλθk−1 ≤ ess inf
σ∈R˜
(1)
θ
k−1
E˜
[
R˜(σ, τˆ∗k−1)|Gθk−1
]
≤ ess sup
τ∈R˜
(2)
θ
k−1
ess inf
σ∈R˜
(1)
θ
k−1
E˜
[
R˜(σ, τ)|Gθk−1
]
= qˆλ
θk−1
.
It is clear that qˆ
λ
θk−1
≥ qˆλ
θk−1
, and therefore the value of the auxiliary constrained risk-sensitive
Dynkin game (3.20)-(3.21) exists, i.e.
Qˆλθk−1 = qˆ
λ
θk−1
= qˆ
λ
θk−1
= qˆλ
θk−1
.
This also implies the recursive equation (3.19) admits a unique solution. Furthermore, since Qˆλθk−1
given by (3.18) satisfies the recursive equation (3.19), it is actually the unique solution of (3.19).
As a direct consequence of (3.23)-(3.25), we can obtain that (σˆ∗k−1, τˆ
∗
k−1), which is given by (3.22),
is indeed an optimal stopping strategy of the auxiliary constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin game
(3.20)-(3.21).
Step 2. It remains to prove the martingale property (i), the supermartingale property (ii) and the
submartingale property (iii) in Step 1.
Indeed, for m ≥ k − 1, we have
E˜
[
Qˆλθm+1∧σˆ∗k−1∧τˆ∗k−1
∣∣∣Gθm] = E˜
[
1{σˆ∗
k−1∧τˆ
∗
k−1≤θm}
Qˆλσˆ∗
k−1∧τˆ
∗
k−1
+ 1{σˆ∗
k−1∧τˆ
∗
k−1≥θm+1}
Qˆλθm+1 |Gθm
]
= 1{σˆ∗
k−1∧τˆ
∗
k−1≤θm}
Qˆλσˆ∗
k−1∧τˆ
∗
k−1
+ 1{σˆ∗
k−1∧τˆ
∗
k−1≥θm+1}
E˜[Qˆλθm+1 |Gθm ]
= 1{σˆ∗
k−1∧τˆ
∗
k−1≤θm}
Qˆλσˆ∗
k−1∧τˆ
∗
k−1
+ 1{σˆ∗
k−1∧τˆ
∗
k−1≥θm+1}
Qˆλθm
= Qˆλθm∧σˆ∗k−1∧τˆ∗k−1
where the second last equality follows from the definition (3.22) of (σˆ∗k−1, τˆ
∗
k−1), and thus the
martingale property (i) has been proved.
To prove the supermartingale property (ii), for any τ ∈ R˜
(2)
θk−1
, we have
E˜
[
Qˆλθm+1∧σˆ∗k−1∧τ
∣∣∣Gθm] = 1{σˆ∗
k−1∧τ≤θm}
Qˆλσˆ∗
k−1∧τ
+ 1{σˆ∗
k−1∧τ≥θm+1}
E˜
[
Qˆλθm+1|Gθm
]
.
Conditional on the set {σˆ∗k−1 ∧ τ ≥ θm+1} ∩ {θm < T }, we have
Qˆλθm = E˜
[
Qˆλθm+1
∣∣∣Gθm]1{θm∈T (1)} +max{L˜θm , E˜ [Qˆλθm+1∣∣∣Gθm]}1{θm∈T (2)}
≥ E˜
[
Qˆλθm+1
∣∣∣Gθm] ,
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and thus
E˜
[
Qˆλθm+1∧σˆ∗k−1∧τ
∣∣∣Gθm] ≤ 1{σˆ∗
k−1∧τ≤θm}
Qˆλσˆ∗
k−1∧τ
+ 1{σˆ∗
k−1∧τ≥θm+1}
(
ξ˜1{θm≥T} + Qˆ
λ
θm
1{θm<T}
)
= Qˆλθm∧σˆ∗k−1∧τ ,
which proves the supermartingale property (ii). Likewise, the submartingale property (iii) can be
proved in a similar way, and the proof of this lemma is thus completed.
We are now in a position to prove Theorem 2.3. Let Q˜λθk−1 be a solution of the recursive equation
(3.11), and in turn,
Q˜λθk−1 = E˜
[
ξ˜1{θk≥T} + Qˆ
λ
θk
1{θk<T}
∣∣∣Gθk−1]
= E˜
[
ξ˜1{θk≥T} + E˜
[
R˜(σˆ∗k, τˆ
∗
k )|Gθk
]
1{θk<T}
∣∣∣∣Gθk−1
]
= E˜
[
E˜
[
ξ˜1{θk≥T} + R˜(σˆ
∗
k, τˆ
∗
k )1{θk<T}|Gθk
]∣∣∣∣Gθk−1
]
= E˜
[
ξ˜
(
1{θk≥T} + 1{σˆ∗k∧τˆ∗k≥T}1{θk<T}
)
+ L˜τˆ∗
k
1{τˆ∗
k
<T,τˆ∗
k
≤σˆ∗
k
}1{θk<T}
+ U˜σˆ∗
k
1{σˆ∗
k
<T,σˆ∗
k
<τˆ∗
k
}1{θk<T}|Gθk−1
]
.
Using the relationship {θk ≥ T } ⊆ {σˆ
∗
k ∧ τˆ
∗
k ≥ T }, {τˆ
∗
k < T, τˆ
∗
k ≤ σˆ
∗
k} ⊆ {θk < T } and {σˆ
∗
k <
T, σˆ∗k < τˆ
∗
k} ⊆ {θk < T }, we can further obtain that
Q˜λθk−1 = E˜
[
ξ˜1{σˆ∗
k
∧τˆ∗
k
≥T} + L˜τˆ∗
k
1{τˆ∗
k
<T,τˆ∗
k
≤σˆ∗
k
} + U˜σˆ∗
k
1{σˆ∗
k
<T,σˆ∗
k
<τˆ∗
k
}|Gθk−1
]
= E˜
[
R˜(σˆ∗k, τˆ
∗
k )|Gθk−1
]
, (3.26)
where (σˆ∗k, τˆ
∗
k ) is the optimal stopping strategy of the auxiliary constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin
game starting from θk given in (3.22). Similarly, we can obtain that, for any τ ∈ R˜
(2)
θk
,
Q˜λθk−1 ≥ E˜
[
R˜(σˆ∗k, τ)|Gθk−1
]
, (3.27)
and, for any σ ∈ R˜
(1)
θk
,
Q˜λθk−1 ≤ E˜
[
R˜(σ, τˆ∗k )|Gθk−1
]
. (3.28)
It follows from (3.27) and (3.28) that
Q˜λθk−1 ≥ ess sup
τ∈R˜
(2)
θ
k
E˜
[
R˜(σˆ∗k, τ)|Gθk−1
]
≥ ess inf
σ∈R˜
(1)
θ
k
ess sup
τ∈R˜
(2)
θ
k
E˜
[
R˜(σ, τ)|Gθk−1
]
= qλθk−1 ,
and
Q˜λθk−1 ≤ ess inf
σ∈R˜
(1)
θ
k
E˜
[
R˜(σ, τˆ∗k )|Gθk−1
]
≤ ess sup
τ∈R˜
(2)
θ
k
ess inf
σ∈R˜
(1)
θ
k
E˜
[
R˜(σ, τ)|Gθk−1
]
= qλ
θk−1
.
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It is clear that qλθk−1 ≥ q
λ
θk−1
, and therefore the value of the constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin
game starting from θk−1 (3.5)-(3.6) exists, i.e.
Q˜λθk−1 = q
λ
θk−1
= qλθk−1 = q
λ
θk−1
.
This also implies the recursive equation (3.11) admits a unique solution. Furthermore, since Q˜λθk−1
given by (3.9) satisfies the recursive equation (3.11), it is actually the unique solution of (3.11).
As a direct consequence of (3.26)-(3.28), we can obtain that (σˆ∗k, τˆ
∗
k ), which is given by (3.22), is
indeed an optimal stopping strategy of the constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin game (3.5)-(3.6).
We conclude the proof by proving (σˆ∗k, τˆ
∗
k ) are actually (σ
∗
k, τ
∗
k ) in (3.8). Indeed,
σˆ∗k = inf{T
(1)
N ≥ θk : Qˆ
λ
T
(1)
N
= U˜
T
(1)
N
} ∧ T
(1)
M1
= inf{T
(1)
N ≥ θk : Q˜
λ
T
(1)
N
≥ U˜
T
(1)
N
} ∧ T
(1)
M1
= σ∗k,
and, similarly, τˆ∗k = τ
∗
k .
4 Connection with stochastic differential games via random-
ized stopping
In this section, we connect constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin games with a class of stochastic
differential games via randomized stopping first introduced by Krylov (see [19]). In particular, we
generalize the optimal control representation of constrained optimal stopping problems in [23] (see
section 4 therein).
Let us introduce the basic idea of randomized stopping in a two-player setting as follows. Con-
sider a nonnegative control process (at)t≥0 (resp. (bt)t≥0), and let Player I (resp. II) stop with
probability at∆ (resp. bt∆) in an infinitesimal interval (t, t+∆). Then the probability that Player
I (resp. II) does not stop before time t is
e−
∫
t
0
au du
(
resp. e−
∫
t
0
bu du
)
,
and the probability that both players do not stop before time t and Player I (resp. II) does stop in
the infinitesimal interval (t, t+∆) is
e−
∫
t
0
(au+bu) duat∆
(
resp. e−
∫
t
0
(au+bu) dubt∆
)
.
Recall that T is a finite F-stopping time representing the (random) terminal time of the game,
and r > 0 represents the discount rate. The discounted payoff is assumed to be e−rtU t if Player
I stops firstly at time t < T , e−rtLt if Player II stops firstly at time t < T , and e
−rT ξ if neither
players stop in the time interval [0, T ], where the auxiliary payoff processes U , L and ξ are given
in (2.8), (2.7), and (2.9), respectively. Thus, the discounted payoff functional associated with the
control processes a and b is given by
J(a, b) =
∫ T
0
e−
∫
t
0
(au+bu+r)du
(
atU t + btLt
)
dt+ e−
∫
T
0
(au+bu+r) duξ,
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or in terms of the original processes L, U and ξ,
J(a, b) =
∫ T
0
e−
∫
t
0
(au+bu) du
[
atg(e
−rtUt +
∫ t
0
e−rufudu) + btg(e
−rtLt +
∫ t
0
e−rufudu)
]
+ e−
∫
T
0
(au+bu) dug(e−rT ξ +
∫ T
0
e−rufudu).
Let us define the control set A(λ(1)) (resp. B(λ(2))) for Player I (resp. II) as
A(λ(1)) = {F-adapted process (at)t≥0 : at = 0 or λ
(1)}
(resp.
B(λ(2)) = {F-adapted process (bt)t≥0 : bt = 0 or λ
(2)}),
and the upper and lower values of the stochastic differential game as
vλ,SDG = inf
a∈A(λ(1))
sup
b∈B(λ(2))
g−1 (E[J(a, b)]) , vλ,SDG = sup
b∈B(λ(2))
inf
a∈A(λ(1))
g−1 (E[J(a, b)]) , (4.1)
where g−1 is the inverse function of the risk-sensitive function g. The game (4.1) is said to have
value vλ,SDG if vλ,SDG = vλ,SDG = vλ,SDG, and (a∗, b∗) ∈ A(λ(1)) × B(λ(2)) is said to be an
optimal pair of controls if vλ,SDG = g−1 (E[J(a∗, b∗)]).
We are now in a position to present the main result of this section.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose that Assumption 2.1 holds. Let (Q
λ
, Z
λ
) be the unique solution to BSDE
(2.6). Then, the value of the stochastic differential game (4.1) exists and equals the value vλ of the
constrained risk-sensitive Dynkin game (2.5), i.e.
vλ,SDG = vλ,SDG = vλ,SDG = vλ = g−1
(
Q
λ
0
)
. (4.2)
Moreover, the optimal pair of controls is given by
a∗t = λ
(1)
1
{Q
λ
t
≥Ut}
, b∗t = λ
(2)
1
{Q
λ
t
≤Lt}
(4.3)
for t ≥ 0.
Proof. Following the similar arguments to the proof of Lemma 3.3, it can be shown that, for
any pair of controls (a, b) ∈ A(λ(1)) × B(λ(2)), E[J(a, b)] = V λ0 (a, b), where the latter is the first
component of the unique solution to the following BSDE with a random terminal time T :
V λt∧T (a, b) = ξ +
∫ T
t∧T
[
au(Uu − V
λ
u (a, b)) + bu(Lu − V
λ
u (a, b))− rV
λ
u (a, b)
]
du−
∫ T
t∧T
Zλu (a, b) dWu,
for t ≥ 0. On the other hand, recall that Q
λ
is the first component of the solution to BSDE (2.6):
Q
λ
t∧T = ξ +
∫ T
t∧T
[
−λ(1)
(
Q
λ
u − Uu
)+
+ λ(2)
(
Lu −Q
λ
u
)+
− rQ
λ
u
]
du −
∫ T
t∧T
Z
λ
u dWu,
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for t ≥ 0. By letting b∗t = λ
(2)
1
{Q
λ
t
≤Lt}
, we obtain the inequality
−λ(1)(Q
λ
u − Uu)
+ + λ(2)(Lu −Q
λ
u )
+ − rQ
λ
u ≤ au(Uu −Q
λ
u) + b
∗
u(Lu −Q
λ
u )− rQ
λ
u
holds for any control a ∈ A(λ(1)), and thus, the BSDE comparison result (see Corollary 4.4.2 in
[8]) yields that
Q
λ
t∧T ≤ V
λ
t∧T (a, b
∗), (4.4)
for t ≥ 0 and any control a ∈ A(λ(1)). Similarly, by letting a∗t = λ
(1)
1
{Q
λ
t
≥Ut}
, we obtain
Q
λ
t∧T ≥ V
λ
t∧T (a
∗, b), (4.5)
for t ≥ 0 and any control b ∈ B(λ(2)), and by letting a∗t = λ
(1)
1
{Q
λ
t
≥Ut}
and b∗t = λ
(2)
1
{Q
λ
t
≤Lt}
, we
obtain the equality
Q
λ
t∧T = V
λ
t∧T (a
∗, b∗). (4.6)
It follows from (4.4) that
g−1
(
Q
λ
0
)
≤ inf
a∈A(λ(1))
g−1
(
V λ0 (a, b
∗)
)
= inf
a∈A(λ(1))
g−1 (E[J(a, b∗)])
≤ sup
b∈B(λ(2))
inf
a∈A(λ(1))
g−1 (E[J(a, b)]) = vλ,SDG.
Likewise, (4.5) yields that g−1
(
Q
λ
0
)
≥ vλ,SDG. Hence, it follows from vλ,SDG ≥ vλ,SDG that (4.2)
holds. As a direct consequence of (4.4)-(4.6), we can obtain (a∗, b∗) in (4.3) is an optimal pair of
controls.
5 Examples
5.1 Example I: Constrained risk-neutral Dynkin games
As the first example, we take the risk-sensitive function to be g(x) = x. This means both players
are risk neutral and, therefore, the corresponding games are called constrained risk-neutral Dynkin
games. In this case, the cost functional in (2.2) is evaluated under the linear expectation E:
E˜ [R(σ, τ)] = E [R(σ, τ)]
with the payoff functional R(σ, τ) given by (2.4). Hence, the upper and lower values of the con-
strained risk-neutral Dynkin game are defined as
vλ,RN = inf
σ∈R
(1)
1
sup
τ∈R
(2)
1
E[R(σ, τ)], and vλ,RN = sup
τ∈R
(2)
1
inf
σ∈R
(1)
1
E[R(σ, τ)]. (5.1)
The game (5.1) is said to have value vλ,RN if vλ,RN = vλ,RN = vλ,RN , and (σ∗,RN , τ∗,RN ) ∈
R
(1)
1 ×R
(2)
1 is called an optimal stopping strategy of the game if
E
[
R(σ∗,RN , τ)
]
≤ E
[
R(σ∗,RN , τ∗,RN )
]
≤ E
[
R(σ, τ∗,RN )
]
17
for every (σ, τ) ∈ R
(1)
1 ×R
(2)
1 .
Recall
Qλt = Q
λ
t −
∫ t∧T
0
e−r(u−t∧T )fu du
in (2.10), where (Q
λ
, Z
λ
) is the unique solution to the characterizing BSDE (2.6). Thus, we deduce
the so-called penalized BSDE with double obstacles on a random horizon [0, T ] (see [7] for the case
of a fixed terminal time T ),
Qλt∧T = ξ +
∫ T
t∧T
[
fs − λ
(1)
(
Qλs − Us
)+
+ λ(2)
(
Ls −Q
λ
s
)+
− rQλs
]
ds−
∫ T
t∧T
Z
λ
s dWs, (5.2)
and Qλt = ξ −
∫ T
0
e−r(u−T )fu du = ξ for t ≥ T .
Assumption 5.1 The risk-sensitive function g(x) = x. Moreover, (i) when T is an unbounded
stopping time, f , L, U and ξ are all bounded; (ii) when T is a bounded stopping time, f ∈ H21,
L ∈ S21, U ∈ S
2
1 and ξ ∈ L
2
1.
Note that the above assumption implies Assumption 2.1 and, therefore, it follows from Theorem
2.3 that BSDE (5.2) admits a unique solution (Qλ, Z
λ
). Moreover, the value of the constrained
risk-neutral Dynkin game (5.1) exists and is given by
vλ,RN = vλ,RN = vλ,RN = Qλ0 .
The optimal stopping strategy is given by

σ∗,RN = inf{T
(1)
N ≥ T
(1)
1 : Q
λ
T
(1)
N
≥ U
T
(1)
N
} ∧ T
(1)
M1
;
τ∗,RN = inf{T
(2)
N ≥ T
(2)
1 : Q
λ
T
(2)
N
≤ L
T
(2)
N
} ∧ T
(2)
M2
.
Remark 5.2 The special case g(x) = x generalizes the results obtained in [23] and [25]. To be
more specific, when λ(1) = 0 (resp. λ(2) = 0), Player I (resp. II) is with a zero intensity control set
and is never allowed to stop, so the value of the constrained risk-neutral Dynkin game (5.1) equals
to the value of the one-player optimal stopping problem with Poisson intervention times introduced
in [23]. On the other hand, when the two intensities coincide, i.e. λ(1) = λ(2), the value of the
constrained risk-neutral Dynkin game (5.1) equals to the value of the Dynkin game with Poisson
intervention times introduced in [25].
5.2 Example II: Constrained Dynkin games with exponential utility
The second example for the risk-sensitive function g is an exponential utility: g(x) = −e−γx for
γ > 0. In this case, the cost functional in (2.2) becomes
E˜ [R(σ, τ)] = −
1
γ
lnE [exp(−γR(σ, τ))]
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with the payoff functional R(σ, τ) given by (2.4). Hence, the upper and lower values of the con-
strained risk-sensitive Dynkin game are defined as
vλ,EU = inf
σ∈R
(1)
1
sup
τ∈R
(2)
1
−
1
γ
lnE[exp(−γR(σ, τ))], (5.3)
vλ,EU = sup
τ∈R
(2)
1
inf
σ∈R
(1)
1
−
1
γ
lnE[exp(−γR(σ, τ))]. (5.4)
The game (5.3)-(5.4) is said to have value vλ,EU if vλ,EU = vλ,EU = vλ,EU , and (σ∗,EU , τ∗,EU ) ∈
R
(1)
1 ×R
(2)
1 is called an optimal stopping strategy of the game if
E˜
[
R(σ∗,EU , τ)
]
≤ E˜
[
R(σ∗,EU , τ∗,EU )
]
≤ E˜
[
R(σ, τ∗,EU )
]
for every (σ, τ) ∈ R
(1)
1 ×R
(2)
1 .
Recall
Qλt = −
1
γ
er(t∧T ) ln(−e−r(t∧T )Q
λ
t )−
∫ t∧T
0
e−r(u−t∧T )fu du
in (2.10), where (Q
λ
, Z
λ
) is the unique solution to the characterizing BSDE (2.6). Thus, we deduce
the following BSDE with quadratic growth on a random horizon [0, T ] (see [18] for the case of a
fixed maturity T ):
Qλt∧T = ξ +
∫ T
t∧T
[
fu −
λ(1)
γ
eru(eγ(e
−ruQλ
u
−e−ruUu) − 1)+ +
λ(2)
γ
eru(1− eγ(e
−ruQλ
u
−e−ruLu))+
− rQλu −
γ
2
e−ru||Zλu ||
2
]
du−
∫ T
t∧T
Zλu dWu, (5.5)
for t ≥ 0, where Zλu = −e
ruZ
λ
u/(γQ
λ
u ), u ∈ [0, T ]. Note that, for t ≥ T ,
Qλt = −
1
γ
erT ln(−e−rT ξ)−
∫ T
0
e−r(u−T )fu du = ξ.
Assumption 5.3 The risk-sensitive function g(x) = −e−γx for γ > 0, and f , L, U and ξ are all
bounded.
Note that the above assumption implies Assumption 2.1 and, therefore, it follows from Theorem
2.3 that BSDE (5.5) admits a unique solution (Qλ, Zλ). Moreover, the value of the constrained
risk-sensitive Dynkin game (5.3)-(5.4) exists and is given by
vλ,EU = vλ,EU = vλ,EU = Qλ0 .
The optimal stopping strategy is given by

σ∗,EU = inf{T
(1)
N ≥ T
(1)
1 : Q
λ
T
(1)
N
≥ U
T
(1)
N
} ∧ T
(1)
M1
;
τ∗,EU = inf{T
(2)
N ≥ T
(2)
1 : Q
λ
T
(2)
N
≤ L
T
(2)
N
} ∧ T
(2)
M2
.
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6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have solved a new class of Dynkin games with a general risk-sensitive criterion
function g and two heterogenous Poisson arrival times as the permitted stopping time strategies for
the two players. Moreover, we have made a connection with a class of stochastic differential games
via the so-called randomized stopping technique.
The approach and the results herein may be extended in various directions. First, one may
consider stochastic intensity models, an undoubtedly important case since the two players’ signal
times may affect each other’s intensities. For example, for i ∈ {1, 2}, if the player i’s first signal
time T
(i)
1 occurs, it will have an impact (either positive or negative) on the other player (3 − i)’s
intensity:
λ
(1)
t = λ
(1) + λ
(1)
1
{T
(2)
1 ≤t}
, λ
(2)
t = λ
(2) + λ
(2)
1
{T
(1)
1 ≤t}
,
for some constants λ(i), λ
(i)
such that the process (λ
(i)
t )t≥0 is always nonnegative. However, various
nontrivial technical difficulties arise. In particular, the resulting characterizing BSDEs will become
a family of recursive equations, whose solvability is far from clear yet.
Second, one may consider that the two players have different attitudes towards risks and are
associated with different information sets. For example, one player is risk-neutral with g(1)(x) = x
and the other has an exponential utility with g(2)(x) = −e−γx. This leads to heterogenous payoff
functionals and, therefore a nonzero-sum constrained Dynkin game arises. The corresponding
characterizing equations will become a BSDE system. Both extensions will be left for the future
research.
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